Objectives. The aims of this paper are threefold: first to review briefly the theoretical literature on competition and its predicted effects on health care quality; secondly to describe the attempts to introduce competition into the UK National Health Service (NHS); and third to review the outcomes of this experiment and ask how far the research findings are consistent with the next phase of reform that the new Labour Government proposed in late 1997.
learn from past experience of services they use on a regular improve quality. They will also be in a powerful position to dictate to and manipulate government, especially if the basis, but serious illness does not give that luxury. A wider problem of information failure exists: there is a serious lack professions concerned are powerful; such organizations ultimately decline [8] . Many argued that that was precisely what of consumer knowledge in the health market. There is also producer ignorance of the likely costs of treatment for was happening to the UK's National Health Service (NHS) and to other similar services in the Scandinavian countries individuals who might well have better information than the health insurer about their condition and an incentive to hide [9] . Yet, the public in these countries wanted to retain free access to health care. this information -this is adverse selection. Where there is knowledge of previous conditions this can preclude the consumer from ever getting insured or only at a prohibitively Quasi-market theory high cost. Risk pooling, by belonging to a large employer's What emerged was a compromise. Perhaps it was possible scheme, can avoid this but insurers wishing to gain the to combine public funding and provision, free access to custom of large employers can make themselves attractive health care and a degree of competition between public by excluding high risk groups and reducing the premiums.
providers of health care. That is what competition in many health markets has done, In the UK, district health authorities would buy services notably in the USA and this has become an increasing focus for their quite large populations -up to half a million people of research.
-from competing hospitals and other providers. General Thus, the economic and health policy literature of the practitioners (GPs) were given limited powers to do the same 1970s and 1980s built up a formidable set of theoretical thing for their own patients. In Sweden county councils reasons why competitive medical care markets might fail would act in a very similar way; in New Zealand large health [3] . Evidence from the USA suggested that, under certain authorities did so; in Finland local municipalities acted as the conditions, increased competition also resulted in medical purchasers; in Germany and the Netherlands the sick clubs price inflation. Where there was a soft budget constraint or social insurance agencies were given the right to compete providers competed by raising quality or scale of service for members. These arrangements would preserve free, or offered regardless of cost to capture market share [4] . Third nearly free, access to services. However, on the supply side, party health insurance, whether public or private, suffered care providers would have to compete for the custom of the from this deficiency. In the 1990s greater international comstate instead of simply claiming an annual budget like a state petition for non-medical products has had its impact on bureaucracy. This would challenge the monopoly power of private health insurance. Firms have been very concerned to the public hospital. cut their health insurance costs and hence to encourage more
The idea of public hospitals drawing profits may seem a competition between the insurers. In the USA this has had strange one but it can be illustrated by quoting two examples. profound effects on health providers.
A hospital or its staff can be deemed to be acting as Observers in Europe, and especially in the UK, were monopolists if they work less efficiently than they would in impressed by the cost containing potential of increased a competitive situation. It was in the interests of hospital competition but they were concerned by the equity imconsultants to have long waiting lists for NHS patients. The plications for health care systems based on the principles of longer patients waited the more likely the patient would give free and equal access. They were especially worried by the up and agree to become a private fee-paying patient of the theories of adverse selection and 'cream-skimming' that had same specialist. This failure to treat quickly could lead to a been developed by American economists in the 1970s [5, 6] . big income gain for the hospital specialist. Incentives for Two kinds of result would follow increased competition: the other staff can also be to work less hard or less efficiently first would be the easiest response -to compete by selecting than they would have to in a competitive situation. Before out the most costly clients -and only secondly would the reforms to the NHS, for example, local GPs in the UK efficiency-based competition take effect. The experience of had to wait long periods for the results of their patients' the USA in the 1980s seemed to bear out that prediction. blood or urine tests or X-rays to be returned from the Reformers in Europe wondered if they could reap the positive hospitals who had a monopoly of the right to do that gains without the negative equity costs of increased comlaboratory work. Employees in the hospital laboratories expetition.
plained that GPs came low down their priorities and the consultant upstairs was always given high priority. There was Government failure no reason to hurry: when GPs were given the chance to choose which laboratory to go to and hospitals and private While some economists were elaborating theories of market failure in health care, others were developing theories of labs were given the chance to compete for the opportunity to supply GPs things changed within weeks: overnight results 'government failure' [7] . In essence, this group of theorists argued that while public agencies may overcome some of the suddenly became possible. So far as could be ascertained this was achieved without significantly lengthening the time problems associated with market failure, they also introduce many of their own. Traditional public monopolies deny consultants had to wait. We should, surely, have heard if it had, although to be fair, no comparable set of waiting time consumer preferences a place and, with captive consumers, health service providers have no driving force to sustain or information was available. This experience is merely quoted to illustrate the kind of 'monopoly inefficiencies' reformers time and aggravation, when their patients have to wait to enter hospital or if the operation is not a success. It is in claimed existed and could be remedied by competition. their interests to insist on good treatment and speedy discharge. They also have the most intimate knowledge of their Limited competition patients' needs and of the quality of the care given to them In principle we would not expect the results of introducing by individual consultants. Health authority staff had no such a quasi-market to be as striking as that which would follow incentives. On the other hand GPs might be expected to be a full market. A true market depends on there being new less interested in broad district-wide health policy and public entrants willing to come in and provide services where poor health issues. Economic theory predicted that the impact of performing hospitals are failing. In reality the Treasury in the the quasi-market would not be great but that it would differ UK would not permit public money to be spent on speculative between the forms of competition that had been introduced. new entrants and private capital was wary of entering a GPs would be more concerned with raising quality and more market dominated by public money and political decisions. successful in doing so. Private markets require the ultimate threat of bankruptcy to make firms take competition seriously. In Eastern Europe, where politicians have been prepared to go on rescuing failing Quality?
firms, their productivity has continued to stagnate even though they have been privatized. In the same way, in practice, Defining what quality we might expect the changes to produce politicians do not find it easy to let a public hospital go is problematic. It was never clearly defined. The following bankrupt. Failing hospitals thus tend to be bailed out even can be deduced from the 1989 White Paper and ministerial when the market suggests they should close. This was a speeches. The aim was to increase: major difficulty with the NHS internal market. On the other hand some specialities in hospitals were in competition with
• responsiveness and speed of treatment in non-emerothers notably in non-emergency work where patients could gency cases; travel.
• convenience in where and how patients were treated; This paper is concerned with the evidence of the results
• number of treatments of the same quality per unit cost;
• the standard of medical quality per unit cost. derived from the UK experiment that introduced a restricted form of competition. District health authorities were given
In short, improvements in medical quality were never the budgets based on the health needs of their populations. The main driving force behind the reforms. Speed and conpopulation of the area was weighted to reflect the probabilities venience and getting more treatments from the same resources of different population groups using hospitals and costing were the priorities. different sums to look after. These factors derived from regression analyses that included age, sex, those living in different social conditions, with different reported long-
The literature
standing illness and in areas with differential mortality rates. Family doctors taking part in the scheme were, initially, given Published material was sought on district-based purchasing, a budget based on their historical level of hospital use but GP fundholding in all its forms, on total purchasing and on were subsequently funded on the same kind of basis as health locality and GP lead commissioning. Electronic data bases authorities. With this budget they could buy services for their were searched -Unicorn, Medline, Health Planning -as patients from hospitals of a limited kind, community health were off print collections, published bibliographies and the services and drugs. Later still some GPs were given a devolved grey literature. Directors of public health in England were budget with which they could buy the full range of health circulated and asked to suggest relevant papers. A full listing care for their patients. In some areas large groups of GPs, and summary of the research in tabular form is contained in with 50-100 000 patients between them, joined together to the Report to the Department of Health (pp. 63-81) [10] . pool their budgets and exert more power over the hospitals Those reported in this paper concentrate on the refereed who served them. These were called multi-funds. Over half of journal articles and official publications which contain eviall GPs assumed some kind of devolved budget responsibility.
dence on outcomes. Hospitals competed for their custom. Other GPs disliked such arrangements but came together to advise district health authorities how to purchase services on their behalf. These groups were often called 'commissioning groups' of GPs, Results but they varied enormously in their powers − some merely being consulted about the district health authority plans while Overall, perhaps the most surprising finding from the pubothers had what amounted to a shadow budget to spend.
lished research was how little difference the whole upheaval In what follows I explore what the research tells us about had made to measurable outcomes. This reaffirmed the the relative impact of these varied forms of competition. cautious broad predictions with which we began. Yet, again GPs had several kinds of incentive to get their patients treated in line with the predictions, there was some evidence the changes had made an impact on the crude indicators of quickly and well. GPs suffer personally, in increased working overall NHS effectiveness. These official figures must be consumer-based market with competition driving it came to exist at district level. Certainly, from the published evidence, treated with great caution. They assume that a patient episode completed is a good outcome which may well not be the it is difficult to see that district-based purchasing made much difference. case. Yet, overall, we have nothing else. Moreover, unless we think there has been a systematic change over time in bad Much more controversial has been the impact of fundholding, which administered a stronger dose of competition. outcomes or a spurious counting trend the data may tell us something. The Department of Health did do some internal It was only concerned originally with elective non-emergency referrals to hospital. Here most GPs had a wide choice of testing to try to judge if the trends could be reflecting spurious counting, such as increases in repeat entry, and concluded alternative provider and some choice even in rural areas. As the theory predicted, fundholders were more prepared than that this was minimal. Despite the warnings the overall trends districts to use their capacity to choose alternative providers are worth reporting. In the 1980s the increase in the number [19] . One study compared GPs' willingness to give patients of patients treated per unit of real spending was rising at a a choice of hospital. Fundholders were more willing to do rate of 1.6% a year. After the reforms the average rise was so, and used a variety of hospitals at greater distance for about 2% per annum, and even higher than that at about elective surgery [20] . However, one study at York suggested 2.5% per annum after the first year [11] . This is a non-trivial that most patients preferred to use their local hospital [21] . improvement, especially as it takes into account the increased
The main burden of evidence derives from a series of obtransaction costs of the market. However, it assumes the very servational case studies and interviews with GP fundholders thing we wish to discuss -the unchanging quality of the over time [19, [22] [23] [24] [25] . These all show a consistent picture. Funoutcome of the episodes. We now try go beyond that crude dholders, at least, were convinced that they had been able, for measure.
the first time, to begin to address issues of communication with hospital consultants about their patients. This has been a longrunning complaint of both patients and GPs. Fundholders were Improved responsiveness to local able to change this. Hospitals did not get paid for the treatment populations unless an adequate discharge letter was received by the GP.
Other practical issues such as appointments systems and the We have seen that responsiveness to consumers was a major prescribing of particular drugs or unnecessary check-ups by goal of government [12] and was reflected in the objectives junior hospital staff, were discussed with hospital consultants. set by the NHS Management Executive [13] . Yet, evidence that Most of these examples concern organizational issues and condistrict health authorities had listened to local communities or venience rather than clinical standards but they are important responded to their views was very difficult to find. Some to patients and most research suggested there was some real authorities did survey their users. North Derbyshire Health movement on these issues. Authority did make direct contact with users of local hospitals Quality specifications in fundholders' contracts were also and asked about their complaints and suggestions for im-more demanding than district health authorities but, in one provement. Poor discharge arrangements and communication multi-fund that was studied, this was not effective in changing failures were identified and addressed in subsequent con-consultants' clinical practice [26] . tractual discussions [14] . The paper that reported this does Another area where change is generally accepted to have not tell us about long-term impact. Similarly, there is anecdotal occurred is that fundholders were able to persuade many evidence of the adoption of users forums but not of their consultants to visit practices and hold outpatients clinics outcomes. A review of purchasing plans in 1995/6 and 1996/ there. This also proved popular with patients and meant that 7 [15] found that authorities were using various methods to more attended their appointments. The family doctor clinics encourage the public to express their views about services -were more user-friendly, in familiar surroundings, and saved representative panels and 'road shows' to get planned changes journey times and time off work [19, 27] . Yet, there is dispute across. Again, there was little direct evidence of health about whether such clinics lead to any health improvement authorities listening or of outcomes. There was little evidence [28, 29] . Again, it is convenience for the patient and not health of systematic needs assessment either. A study of the first 2 gain that has been established. years of purchasing in eight authorities reported very mixed These results have been criticized on the grounds that and hesitant attempts to do this [16] . The reasons may lie in those GPs who chose to enter the scheme were the best the regulatory regime. Health authorities were monitored and practices. Such studies are, it is claimed, guilty of selection chief officers were rewarded, not on the extent to which they bias [30] . There is something in both points. Later entrants met locally defined needs, but on the measures of activity -were probably less radical than the pioneers but they were patients treated and waiting lists reduced as well as cost also learning from the strategies adopted by their predecessors control [17] . Indeed, the whole process of setting contracts and hence many were at least as effective as change agents. at district level restricted GPs' choice of hospital for their Moreover, most of the comparisons quoted above were based on before and after reform outcomes for the same practices. patients. Exceptions could be made if a GP wanted to refer a patient to a hospital with which a district did not have a Another legitimate criticism of the findings is the likely presence of the Hawthorne effect. Enthusiasm may wane. contract but the process was time-consuming and very costly [18] . All in all it is very difficult to claim that anything like a The fact that such GPs fought so hard to keep the scheme in the run up to the 1997 Election and after it, however, provider split was that the purchasers would have a clear brief to consider the cost effectiveness of the purchases they suggests that there was more than a mirage there. Thus, though these findings may be viewed sceptically, the broad were making from those who were providing services in their area or to their patients. To this end the Department of substance and direction seems reliable.
Health funded a Centre at York University that would collect and disseminate cost effectiveness studies which would be Speedier treatment available for purchasers to use in buying services. What Speed of treatment and waiting lists for non-emergency evidence there is suggests that such considerations featured treatment have always been the Achilles heel of the NHS. very little in the choice of contracts [32] . Academic cost The competition introduced was, perhaps, primarily directed effectiveness work concentrates on outcomes of very specific at trying to improve this aspect of service quality. The overall treatments whereas health authorities made very general statistics are quite impressive. In 1989 when the Government's contracts with a whole hospital or speciality, leaving decisions White Paper on reforming the system was published 220 000 about particular treatments to the medical staff. people had been waiting for treatment in England for more than 1 year and 90 000 for more than 2 years. These figures Cost effectiveness judgements had changed little in the late 1980s. By March 1997 this Allocations to broad specialities and kinds of service do not figure had fallen to 31 000 waits of over 1 year and none seem to have changed much. However, as health authorities over 2 years. The problem with assigning these results to the gained experience they did begin to exclude certain very new competitive environment is that the Government also costly treatments -in vitro fertilization being the most increased the budget for this purpose at the same time. When obvious example [33] -or cosmetic treatments. On a more it tightened the budget again in 1996 and 1997 numbers on general level the pure average cost per treatment in a speciality waiting lists rose again but, as we see, to nothing like the did feature as a reason for moving contracts. This was levels of the late 1980s. Numbers waiting less than 1 year notably true of high cost research led teaching hospitals. also rose, but this in part reflected the increase in the numbers Here expensive facilities needed for research and complex being treated at all. Everyone treated as a non-emergency cases were cross-subsidized under the old arrangements. This case is by definition on a waiting list for some period, however was an inappropriate way to fund such research because it short. All in all it is difficult to deny that the reform package was at the cost of ordinary patients in the areas served by as a whole did have a significant impact on the speed of the hospitals, notably in the poor areas of cities such as treatment overall in the NHS.
London. This forced the Government to decide how to fund Did the more competitive fundholders, who had more to such research more explicitly. The market thus made the gain by challenging the hospitals' monopoly power, gain any Government consider the issue of quality research vs. current better results? Here there has been a large amount of anecdotal care for patients -present vs. future quality. Whether it got claim and counter claim. The Audit Commission said that they this right or devoted enough to future quality may be debated, found no difference in waiting times between fundholders and but to an economist, forcing the debate into the open was others. But this was a very limited study that took no account a good outcome of competition. of the different reasons for long waits -choice by patient or enforced waits [25] . There is, however, one study that is More cost effective prescribing based firmly on a retrospective follow-up of all the patients Fundholders were in a better position to take cost efreferred to hospital for the treatments covered by the fundfectiveness studies into account because they were more likely holding scheme over a period of 4 years in four hospitals to be considering trade-offs between types of treatment. [31] . This used a data base of 57 000 patients. Before GPs However, they were also less well equipped to use such became fundholders the waiting times of those 'to be funmaterial as busy medical practitioners, but one area where dholders' were not significantly different from those of nonthey clearly seem to have done so concerns prescribing. Many fundholders. After becoming fundholders their patients' waitstudies have looked at prescribing outcomes and the early ing times became significantly shorter and did so with each findings were conflicting. Most found early reductions by new wave of new fundholders. An analysis of the budgets first wavers but suggested this was short-lived and may have and resources available to the two groups of GPs showed been due to inflating prescriptions prior to entering the they were virtually the same. The hospital managers and the scheme. Others suggested that non-fundholders were more consultants were interviewed to explain the outcome. They successful. These conflicting results were mostly derived from argued that the hospitals feared that GPs would switch small-scale studies. The most recent and thorough studies custom and districts would not. GPs were, they thought, have used the national data on prescribing by all practices in much more effective advocates for their patients than district the country. There was limited evidence that fundholders did contracting staff were. They pressed their patients' interests use both cost and efficacy research in making judgements because they were consistent with their own.
about what prescribing policy the practices should adopt [19] . The national studies showed that first wave fundholders Cost effectiveness increased their drug spending less than non-fundholders to a significant extent. They had an expenditure of 8% less than Use of cost effectiveness evidence The intention behind the introduction of the purchaser-that of non-fundholders. The next waves made savings of 6% compared to all other GPs [34] . A study of practices'
Only one study tried to assess the impact of fundholding on the clinical quality of care [43] . This was, however, a prescribing patterns in Northern Ireland produced very similar before and after study which had no control group so we findings [35] . The critical question is whether this reduced do not know if the same thing was happening to patients of the quality of the care that patients received. In the two quoted non-fundholders. It showed that the length of consultation studies the reductions in relative spending were achieved by with GPs remained unchanged before and after the change reducing the cost of the prescriptions not the number per to fundholding status. The prescription of drugs to treat back patient. Only one study carefully tried to answer the question pain remained the same but patients reported themselves less of quality of care. Howie and colleagues at Edinburgh [36] able to cope with their illness. This may reflect the generally concluded that fundholding GPs were slower to prescribe more critical attitude of the public that accompanied the newer and more expensive pharmaceuticals but that in the introduction of the reforms. The study also investigated tracer conditions they followed-up the GPs were making changes in treatment in the case of over a dozen conditions appropriate judgements and that the quality of prescribing including asthma, angina and diabetes. Here the conclusion had been maintained.
was that quality of care had been largely maintained. However, in some areas such as patients suffering from social and Medical care quality psychological problems the quality of care seemed to have As we have seen, improving medical care quality in the declined [44] . narrow sense was not part of the European agenda and
Patients' views about the quality of care they received was especially not in the case of the UK. The aim was to sustain surveyed in the case of those GP practices who joined the quality while containing costs and improving convenience total purchasing pilots -where GPs controlled the whole and consumer concerns of other kinds. Nevertheless, the medical care budget rather as a primary care lead health crucial question is how far these changes may have in-maintenance organization (HMO) would. Here there was a advertently reduced the quality of medical care. There is very control group of non-fundholding patients [45] . The results little direct evidence on this score.
showed that there was more satisfaction with all aspects of Defining and measuring quality and holding other factors care from patients of the total purchasing groups than with constant proved beyond the capacity of rather limited research patients of non-fundholders: 51% of the fundholders' patients efforts devoted to the topic in the UK [37] . Some research felt they had been given choices in their care compared with examined the extent to which quality of care indicators had 35% of non-fundholders. been used to set standards in contracts or to judge outcomes.
All in all evidence on medical quality flowing from the rise in competition is meagre one way or the other. While it They found relatively little of this happening. One study is difficult to prove that there was a decisive improvement found that about 60% of health authorities did demand some it is equally difficult to show there has been a marked decline. quality outcome measures in some of their contracts [38] .
Nor is there evidence that 'cream skimming' took place. The However, these were linked to financial arrangements inincentives in the UK case for this to happen were small. centives in only 20% of cases. One study reported on three District health authorities' budgets were set on a population health authorities, one of which attached a series of quality basis and they had no control on who moved into their areas. criteria to each clinical contract [39] . These were derived As far as fundholders were concerned those who designed from national advice in such sources as the national Effective the system were at pains to prevent it. Patients who cost the Health Care Bulletins.
GP practice a lot more to treat were covered by an arUsing the power to remove contracts from units that failed rangement under which the district health authority met the on the quality criteria proved difficult and sometimes counter extra over a given limit in any one case. The costs of treatment productive. Since politicians were reluctant to close a facility covered by fundholding were relatively cheap. The formula or permit staff redundancy, reducing a budget as a punishment funding took account of age and sex driven differences in merely reduced the quality even more [40] . What was emerging costs and the doctors themselves did not lose directly if they clearly by 1997 was a process of 'soft contracting' [41] . Health took on expensive patients. This was different from the very authorities would take a particular service or speciality for direct incentives to cream skim that applied in American study in 1 year. Concerns may have been raised by GPs or HMOs. Even so residual worries existed that cream skimming users, or arose from looking at the health outcome data. This might begin to happen without a careful adjustment to the service would then be reviewed in depth sometimes using formulae on which funding was based [46] . external experts and a constructive discussion engaged in with the professionals concerned about how to address quality issues.
In the changes the new Labour Government proposed in Research and policy late 1997 the soft contracting model became the preferred one. Annual contracting was to be replaced by service agreements Overall then, the research evidence tended to support the probably lasting for 3 years or more. However, the right to hypothesis that there were some efficiency gains to be reaped change provider -the exit sanction -would remain if by challenging the virtual monopoly situation NHS hospitals the new GP led agencies making these agreements were had enjoyed. This was done most effectively by those who themselves had an interest in seeing their patients treated dissatisfied with the service [42] . quickly and well -local GPs. They were also independent with the equity of tax funding continues. The end of this road is not yet in sight. enough not to be captured by political pressures to prevent the market from working. Yet, this was an administratively costly solution and the overall impact of the changes was not dramatic. Nor was this surprising: GP fundholders, who Acknowledgements seemed the most effective agents, only controlled a little over 10% of the total NHS budget. Where GPs had joined This paper draws on work undertaken by colleagues at the together to influence district health authority purchasing or London School of Economics and the Kings Fund and commissioning there was some evidence that they, too, had sponsored by the UK Department of Health: Models of been effective but not as effective as GPs who held budgets Purchasing and Commissioning: Review of the Research Evidence: A [47] . Those commissioning groups that had been most effect-Report to the Department of Health by J. Le Grand, N. Mays, J.-ive in this respect had something like a devolved budget or A. Mulligan, N. Goodwin, J. Dixon and H. Glennerster. strong support from their districts in backing their demands Neither these authors nor the Department of Health are on hospitals and a preparedness to move custom if quality responsible for the interpretations here. was not improved.
The Labour Party in opposition had been firmly against the market reforms in general and GP fundholding in par-References ticular. Faced with the strong support of many GPs who had gained greater say and improved services the pure politics of The most effective champions of patient convenience and speed of treatment -the GPs -will be given the role of 6. Rothschild M, Stiglitz J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance buying or arranging services for their own patients in England.
markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information.
The whole, or nearly the whole health budget will be devolved to be extended to all GPs. They will be grouped for this versity Press, 1970. purpose into units of 50 doctors or so serving populations of approximately 100 000 or less. They will hold a budget 9. Saltman R, von Otter C. Planned Markets and Public Competition.
that will cover nearly the whole of the NHS services excluding of GPs' capacity to exit from low quality providers. It was 28-30. this the research evidence suggested had some impact on the system was less good at providing -speed and convenience. The attempt to match the incentive power of competition 16. Freemantle N, Watt I, Mason J. Developments in the purchasing
